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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A UNITED STATES APPROACH
TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Philip C. Jessup*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states the purposes of that
organization. Prominent among these purposes is "to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations whichi might lead to a breach of the peace." Some writers
have sought to make a point from the order of the words--"justice" is
mentioned before "international law." But the function of the
International Court of Justice is "to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it."' I doubt if
there is any actual or intended dichotomy between the two
prescriptions. Nor would I agree with an exegesis which suggested that
"situations" are to be "adjusted" on the basis of "justice," while
"disputes" are to be "settled" on the basis of "international law."
The concept of a World Court with a bench of judges serving full
time has been a favorite theme with American statesmen from the first
years of the twentieth century. Recognizing that international
arbitration is also a judicial process, George Kennan writes that
* Former Judge, International Court of Justice; former United States
Representative, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. A.B.,
1919, Hamilton College; LL.B., 1924, Yale University; A.M., 1924, Ph.D., 1927,
Columbia University.
The substance of this article is taken from a manuscript prepared by the author
as Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 1970-71.
Acknowledgement is made here, en masse, to the assistance received from many
persons in obtaining data and in editing the manuscript.
1. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1 (emphasis added).
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"Arbitration, then, was our first love and our first hope."2 He makes
the common mistake of asserting that really vital disputes could never
be submitted to judicial decision. Yet the assertion is not erroneous
within his frame of reference, which is diplomacy on the grand scale
among the Great Powers. It is of no significance to Kennan that
smaller powers may gain or lose large percentages of national territory
by arbitral awards. It is true that just as often they have gained or lost
by the imposed fiat of the Great Powers. Thus, Kennan might say also
that Canada was forced by Great Britain to submit to artibration the
Alaskan boundary dispute that Theodore Roosevelt considered vital
enough to warrant its solution by the American army if necessary.
Kennan concludes that Secretary of State Elihu Root had no
"sympathy or understanding for the idea of dealing with political
differences on their merits and by the processes of diplomacy, at least
not where there was any possibility that legal procedures could be
devised to replace the diplomatic method.. .. ,,3 This is a hasty
judgment that is a complete misunderstanding of Root and that
ignores his handling of United States relations with Latin America,
Japan and various European governments. It ignores also the modem
use of the International Court as part of the political processes of the
United Nations in seeking to defuse potentially explosive situations.
This article is not'designed as a history of the International Court of
Justice, nor as a legal analysis of the way in which the Court
functions.4 Rather, the purpose is to describe the attitude of the
United States, i.e., the Department of State, toward the actual use of
the Court in a variety of situations, some of which involved important
interests of the United States and others of which did not. The
concentration in this article is on the jurisdiction of the Court to give
advisory opinions, since it is in connection with proposals to request
such opinions that all members of the United Nations have an
opportunity to express their views and to exercise their influence for
or against the use of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
In most contentious cases, only the states parties to the dispute are
involved, although note will be taken of certain situations in which the
General Assembly or Security Council urged the parties to resort to
the Court. Before dealing with the proposals to request advisory
opinions, the attitude of the United States toward the use of the
2. Kennan, Arbitration and Conciliation in American Diplomacy, 26 ARBITRATION

J. 1, 6 (1971).

3. Id. at 18.
4. See generally JESSUP,

(1971);

THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 51-82
ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT

(1965).
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International Court of Justice is indicated by United States domestic
law and by a series of cases in which the United States sought to
secure a decision from the Court.

II.

UNITED STATES ATTITUDES

The State Department has recently displayed a conviction that the
United States should break loose from the shackles of the "Connally
Amendment,"' by which the Senate emasculated acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the Court. The "Connally Amendment" was proposed

on the Senate floor in 1946 by Senator Connally of Texas at the
instigation of John Foster Dulles, although the same proposal had
already been rejected by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
The Amendment provides in essence that although the United States
purports to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court to decide cases
involving legal issues, the United States Government can block the
Court's jurisdiction in any case in which another state brings a suit
against it simply by saying that the United States claims that the issue
is within its domestic jurisdiction. Such an assertion was intended to
6
be unreviewable by the Court.
The illustrative case was Interhandel,7 a suit brought by
Switzerland against the United States in 1957. Basically, the case
concerned the seizure by the United States during World War II of
assets of a company that the United States claimed was German and
therefore "enemy," but that the Swiss contended was actually a Swiss
enterprise and therefore "neutral." In its response to the Swiss
application to the Court, the United States advanced a number of
defensive pleas. The Court, by a vote of nine to six, upheld the United
States argument that the Swiss Government should, in accordance
with an established rule of international law, exhaust its remedies in
the courts of the United States before resorting to an international
forum. This conclusion terminated the International Court proceedings. Another of the defenses of the United States was based squarely
on the Connally Amendment, and asserted that the Court had no
jurisdiction because the United States had determined that the
questions at issue were "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"

of the United States. 8 A supplementary plea argued that the questions
were "according to international law, matters within the domestic
5.
6.
7.
8.

61 Stat. 1218, at para. 2, clause b (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
It is unnecessary here to discuss the arguments on this point.
Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6.
[1959] I.C.J. at 15.
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jurisdiction of the United States." 9 The Court rejected this latter
argument by fourteen votes to one, but held it unnecessary to pass
upon the defense based on the Connally Amendment. Two judges, Sir
Percey Spender of Australia and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht of England,
held that the Connally Amendment invalidated entirely the purported
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court and, consequently, that the
Court had no jurisdiction.' 0
It is not controverted that any such reservation has a reciprocal
effect, which means that if the United States files with the Court a
suit against any other state, the defendant state can have the case

thrown out merely by saying that on the basis of reciprocity, it
invokes the United States Connally Amendment and "claims" that the
matter at issue is solely within its domestic jurisdiction. On a recent
unpublicized occasion, when the State Department suggested to
Canada that a certain dispute be referred to the International Court,
Canada refused and said that it would invoke the reciprocal feature of
the Connally reservation if the United States applied to the Court. In
1970, Canada revised its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to
exclude specifically any challenge to its claims to protective
jurisdiction in the Arctic waters, thereby blocking the possibility that
the United States might air its challenge before the International
Court at The Hague.'' Another illustration of this reciprocal effect is
provided by the United States case against Bulgaria following the
aerial incident in which an Israeli El Al passenger plane was shot down
over Bulgaria, with the resulting death of six American nationals. The
United States withdrew this case on May 30, 1960,12 due to a
realization that the suit could be blocked by Bulgarian invocation of
the Connally Amendment, although an attempt had been made in the
application to avoid that possibility.'" Perhaps the United States
9. [1959] I.C.J. at 24 (emphasis added).
10. [1959] I.C.J. at 54, 95. The United States was at least nominally a
defendant in the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943,
[1954] I.C.J. 19. The case was brought by Italy in 1953 and France and Great
Britain were also defendants. Despite its interesting title, the case was abortive and
the United States took little interest in it, although it did not object to the
jurisdiction of the Court. The Court in its judgment of June 15, 1954, held that it
could not adjudicate upon the submissions of the Italian Government.
11. All pertinent documents are reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
598 (1970).
12. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, [1960], I.C.J. 146.

13. The British Government withdrew a similar complaint at about the same
time since the Court had rejected the principal suit brought by Israel on the
ground that there was not extant any valid Bulgarian acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
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could have induced the Court to reconsider the decision it rendered in
the case brought by Israel, but the Bulgarian invocation of the
Connally Amendment forced the Legal Adviser of the State
Department to "eat crow," which he did honestly and openly in his
letter to the Court of May 13, 1960. In the following extract from
that letter, the "second preliminary objection of Bulgaria" refers to
Bulgaria's invocation of the reciprocal application of the Connally
Amendment, and "reservation (b)" refers to that part of the Connally
Amendment that is here under discussion. The letter reads in part:
In that part of the Written Observations which relates to the second
preliminary objection of Bulgaria, a contention was advanced on behalf of
the United States with respect to reservation (b) attached to the acceptance
by the United States of the jurisdiction of the Court. That contention was
to the effect that reservation (b) did not authorize or empower Bulgaria to
make an arbitrary determination that a particular matter was essentially
within its domestic jurisdiction. The necessary premise of the argument was
that the Court must have jurisdiction for the limited purpose of deciding
whether a determination under reservation (b) is arbitrary and without

foundation. On the basis of further study and consideration of the history
and background of reservation (b) and the position heretofore taken by the
United States with respect to reservation (b) in litigation before the Court,
it has been concluded that the premise of the argument is not valid and that
the argument must therefore be withdrawn. As it was declared by the
United States to this Court in the Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United
States), when the United States has made a determination under reservation
(b) that a particular matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction,
that determination is not subject to review or approval by any tribunal, and
it operates to remove definitively from the jurisdiction of the Court the
matter which it determines. A determination under reservation (b) that a
matter is essentially domestic constitutes an absolute bar to jurisdiction
irrespective of the propriety or arbitrariness of the determination. Although
the United States has adhered to the policy of not making any arbitrary
determination under reservation (b), the pursuit of that policy does not
affect the legal scope of the reservation. Under the rule of reciprocity
applied by the Court in the case concerning Certain Norwegian Loans
(France v. Norway), Bulgaria is accorded the same rights and powers with
respect to reservation (b) as the United States. Accordingly, the
Government of the United States withdraws that part of its Written
Observations and Submissions which relates to the second preliminary
objection of Bulgaria.' 4

14. This letter, as well as the written observations, was signed by Mr. Eric H.
Hager, Agent of the United States of America. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955,
I.C.J. Pleadings 677 (1960). The whole case is skillfully analyzed in Gross,
BulgariaInvokes the Connally Amendment, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 357 (1962).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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The United States submitted to the Court's jurisdiction in the Case
Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco; 5 it
found it advantageous to have the Court pass on that question. There
were, however, other cases that the United States submitted to the
Court despite an awareness that the Court would not have jurisdiction
and could not adjudicate upon them. All of those cases concerned
aerial incidents and were against the Soviet Union or its Eastern
European allies. There is no doubt that the United States, the
aggrieved party in each case, would have been glad to have the Court
assess the responsibility of any of the Communist states that shot
down American planes, but the actual applications to the Court must
be considered as gestures designed to reveal this country's devotion to
the ideal of judicial settlement of international disputes and to expose
the undeviating refusal by our adversaries to accept any third-party
settlement of disputes to which they were parties. The only instance
revealing Russian enthusiasm for the Court was in 1962, when the
Soviet Union supported the attempt by Cuba to have the Security
Council request the Court for an advisory opinion on the nature of
anti-Castro actions of the Organization of American States.

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, speaking for the United States, stated in
the Security Council that "What we have here is not a legal dispute.
What we have is a cold war political attack, through the Cuban
communist regime, on the Organization of American States.... The
International Court of Justice should not be brought into the cold war
or into the jungle of communist propaganda." 1 6 Although the Soviet
Union and its allies, as potential defendants before the Court in the
various politically motivated cases brought by the United States, did
not use precisely Stevenson's language, they might have echoed its
sentiments, mutatis mutandis. The general drift of their communications to the Court was to the effect that American planes had violated
their territorial airspace, that the American claims were quite
unfounded and, therefore, that there was nothing for the Court to
decide.
The first of these cases submitted by the United States to the Court
was a double-header. On February 16, 1954, the United States filed
with the Court two applications instituting proceedings against both
Hungary and the Soviet Union on account of the "Treatment in
Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America." The
airplane had been forced down when it strayed off course and the

15. [1952] I.C.J. 178.
16. 17 U.N. SCOR, 993rd meeting 24 (1962); 17 U.N. SCOR, 994th meeting
7 (1962).
Winter, 1971
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airmen had been seized by Soviet officials and tried by the
Hungarians. 1" The attitude in the State Department is revealed by a
memorandum of January 14, 1953, sent by Sam Klaus of the Office
of the Legal Adviser to Charles Bevans of the same office. Klaus
attached to his memorandum a detailed 81-page account. His general
recommendation was that the United States should demand from the
Hungarian Government full information and the return of the airmen.
If the Hungarian Government should contest its liability, they should
be asked to join in submitting the case to the International Court of
Justice. If they refused that proposal, the United States should
announce its determination to take up the matter in the United
Nations, either in the Interim Committee of the General Assembly or
in the Assembly itself. The United States would propose setting up a
commission of jurists to investigate the incident, and the report of
such a commission could be referred by the General Assembly to the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Such a
procedure, Klaus suggested, would give the United States a solid basis
for its claim to damages and thereby permit the Americans to decide
whether to seek satisfaction from Hungarian assets in the United
States. Klaus anticipated that the Court, if seized of the case, might
not assess damages but would at least propound general principles of
law.
Apparently, further consideration of the case in the State
Department led to the institution of the two cases in the Court, one
against the Hungarian People's Republic' 8 and the other against the
Soviet Union I It was alleged that the Hungarian Government acted
"inconcert" with the Soviet Government. The United States told the
Court that it had invited both governments to submit to the Court's
jurisdiction, but had not received "any responsive reply to the
invitation."'2 0 It noted, however, that both governments were
"qualified to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court."'2 1 The
Hungarian Government tersely informed the Court that it was "unable
to submit in this case to the jurisdiction of the International Court of

Justice." 2 2 The Soviet Government's statement was more elaborate. It

17. Applications Instituting Proceedings, Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft
and Crew of United States of America, I.C.J. Pleadings 8 (1954).
18. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America
Case, [1954] I.C.J. 99.
19. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America
Case, [1954] I.C.J. 103.
20. [1954] I.C.J. at 100; [1954] I.C.J. at 104.
21. [1954] I.C.J. at 100; [1954] I.C.J. at 104.
22. [1954] I.C.J. at 100.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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"regards as unacceptable the proposal of the Government of the
United States of America" that the Court "should examine the case
concerning the American aircraft which violated the State frontier of
the Hungarian People's Republic" and that "there exists no subject for
consideration" by the Court.2 3 Accordingly, the Soviet Government
could "see no reason why this question should be examined by the
International Court of Justice." 2 4 Since the Court lacked the consent

of the defendants, it had no jurisdiction and was forced to remove the
case from its list.
The next such case was a United States action against
Czechoslovakia for "certain wrongful acts committed by MIG-type
aircraft from Czechoslovakia within the United States zone of
occupation in Germany on March 10, 1953."2 1 The application to the
Court was not filed until March 14, 1956.26 The Czech Government
informed the Court that, as it had already told the United States, the
aerial incident in question "occurred above Czechoslovak air
space ... by American military aircraft." The United States' claims
were "without point" and the application was "totally unfounded."
The Czech Government, therefore, could "see no reason why this case
should be considered by the International Court of Justice." 2 7 The
Court struck the case from its list.
On the same day, March 14, 1956, the United States filed another
application against the Soviet Union, complaining of certain allegedly
wilful acts committed by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Government
against a United States B-29 aircraft and its crew off Hokaido, Japan,
on October 7, 1952.28 The Soviet Government told the Court that it
had already advised the United States that "since the American
military aircraft violated the frontier of the U.S.S.R. and opened fire
without any reason upon Soviet fighter aircraft, responsibility for the
incident which occurred and for its consequences rests entirely upon
the American side." The United States' claim being "totally
unfounded," there was no reason for the Court to deal with it. 2 9 How
the dockets could be uncrowded in a national court if a lawsuit could

23. [1954] I.C.J. at 105.
24. [1954] I.C.J. at 105.
25. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953, [1954] I.C.J. 6.
26. An illustrative exchange of notes in complaint of the aerial incidents may
be found in 29 DEP'T STATE BULL. 180 (1953).
27. [1954] I.C.J. at 7-8.
28. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of October 7th, 1952, [1954] I.C.J.
9.
29. [1954] I.C.J. at 10-11.
Winter, 1971
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be dismissed merely by the defendant's statement that the claim was
"totally unfounded"!

The last of these cases was a United States application of December
9, 1958, against the Soviet Union, complaining of "certain willful acts
committed by military aircraft of the Soviet Government on
September 4, 1954, in the international airspace over the Sea of Japan
against a United States Navy P2-V-type aircraft, commonly known as
a Neptune type, and against its crew." '3 0 The Soviet response was the
same: violation of its frontier and opening fire on Soviet fighters. But
the Soviet note to the Court added a new element. It stated that
according to article 36 of the Statute of the Court, disputes could be
"transmitted" to the Court only by "common consent of both
sides." 3 ' Since the Soviet Government did not consent, the United
States "acted in disaccord with the Statute." 32 And, as usual, there
were no questions in the case "which are of need to be considered" by
the Court.3 3 The United States quickly and correctly pointed out that
it was "well settled that any government qualified to appear before
this Court may file its application without prior special agreement." 3 4
However, since the Court had no jurisdiction over the dispute, it
removed the case from its list.
This aerial incident case had a sort of dithyrambic prologue, with
Henry Cabot Lodge as the leader and the members of the United
Nations Security Council as the chorus .3 The United States
immediately submitted the aerial incident to the Security Council and
Ambassador Lodge made his opening speech on September 10, 1954.
He said that the United States had "long felt that the correct forum
for the solution of such problems is the International Court of Justice,
where such cases can be considered on their merits. The United States
Government realizes that the judicial process followed by the Court

offers the best means of resolving cases of this type." 36 But, Lodge
explained, only four months before this date the United States had
proposed to the Soviet Government that the Hungarian aerial incident
30. Application Instituting Proceedings, Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954,
I.C.J. Pleadings 8 (1958).
31. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of September 4th, 1954, [1958]
I.C.J. 158, 160.

32. [1958] I.C.J. at 160.
33. [1958] I.C.J. at 160.
34. [1958] I.C.J. at 160.
35. This is not to suggest that Lodge was Dionysiac, but rather that he led the

dialogue after the manner introduced by Thespis. See A.E. HAIGH,
27 (1896).
36. 9 U.N. SCOR, 679th meeting 7-8 (1954).
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should be referred to the Court and this proposal had been
"categorically refused by the Soviet Government." 3 7 So the case was

brought before the Security Council. No action was taken; probably,
none was expected.
In 1960, the Soviet Union tried to turn the tables on the United
States. The Soviet Government submitted to the Security Council the
case of a United States aircraft, an RB-47, on a mission over the
Barents Sea. The Soviets alleged that the plane had violated its aerial
frontier and was over Soviet territory when it was shot down.
Kuznetsov, the Soviet Representative to the Security Council, indeed
accused Ambassador Lodge of Thespianism when he said:
May I ask Mr. Lodge whether he really thinks that his theatrical methods, to
which the United States representatives have been resorting with increasing
frequency in recent Security Council meetings, can convince anybody? He
should have realized long ago that the Security Council is not a stage for
of performance, which is designed to produce a very cheap
that kind
38
effect.
Ambassador Lodge did reply rather theatrically:
The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is that we
shoot their aircraft with cameras; they shoot ours with guns and rockets and
kill or imprison our crews-even though not one man, woman or child in
Russia has ever been injured by any of our aircraft. Not one.3 9
In addition, however, Ambassador Lodge introduced a resolution
whereby the Security Council would have called upon the two parties
to settle the dispute either by setting up a commission to investigate
the facts or by referring the case to the International Court of Justice.
The resolution received nine votes in favor, but one of the two
negative votes was that of the Soviet Union, thereby constituting a
veto. 4 o
It is true that aircraft occasionally miscalculate their position or are
forced by weather conditions to deviate from their flight path. The
Soviet Union and its satellite states, however, do not seem to be

inclined to give the aircraft of other countries the benefit of this
doubt. In public contemplation these days, United States military or
naval aircraft may be suspected of espionage, but the same suspicion
generally does not attach to the Swedish Air Force. Therefore, it is
noteworthy that in 1952 the Swedish Government protested to the
Soviet Government against attacks upon two Swedish aircraft over the

37.
38.
39.
40.

9 U.N. SCOR, 679th meeting 8 (1954).
15 U.N. SCOR, 881st meeting 8 (1960).
15 U.N. SCOR, 883rd meeting 34 (1960).
15 U.N. SCOR, 883rd meeting 39 (1960).
Winter, 1971

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARD THE ICJ

Baltic Sea, The Soviet's reply to Sweden followed the stereotype of
replies to the protests of the United States: Swedish aircraft had
violated the Soviet frontier and in at least one case were alleged to
have opened fire on Soviet fighter aircraft. Like the United States, the
Swedish Government proposed that some international procedure be
utilized to establish the facts and suggested that the International
Court of Justice would be the most suitable forum for dealing with
the dispute. The Soviet reply was a variation on its usual theme:
As regards the Swedish Government's statement that it will insist upon an
examination of the matter under discussion by the International Court of
Justice or in accordance with some other suitable international procedure,
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to draw attention to
the fact that the protection of the frontiers of the Soviet Union against any
encroachment is the Soviet State's inalienable right and duty. The Ministry
for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union cannot, therefore, see any reason for
resorting to any international procedure for the examination of questions
41
connected with encroachments on the Soviet Union's frontiers.

III.

ADVISORY

OPINIONS

In general, the United States has favored proposals to refer disputes
between states and questions of a constitutional character concerning
the operations of the United Nations under the Charter to the
International Court of Justice for advisory opinions. When such a
proposal is made in connection with a political issue, it may be
motivated by the hope that the parties will agree to submit to the
Court and that the Court's decision will either end the dispute or
contribute to its solution. Another motivation is the expectation that
the dispute will not be aggravated while the matter is sub judice and
that, in the meantime, other diplomatic procedures may lead to a
solution. Both of these motivations have an historical antecedent in
the policy of the Council of the League of Nations to resort
frequently to the Permanent Court of International Justice for
advisory opinions, particularly to secure authoritative interpretations
of contested articles of the peace treaties concluded at the end of
World War I. That is a useful service that the Court can render. Even if
41. This quotation from the Soviet note of July 16, 1952, is taken from
Attacks upon Two Swedish Aircraft over the Baltic in June 1952: Notes
Exchanged Between Sweden and the Soviet Union, Press Releases, etc., 11:2
DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE ROYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, NEW SERIES 32 (Stockholm 1952).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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the Court's opinion does not lead to a settlement of the dispute, the
accumulating jurisprudence of the Court contributes to the development of international law. This contribution is particularly notable in
the important subject of the rules for the interpretation of treaties;
furthermore, future potentialities in this area are enhanced by the fact
that there now has been wide acceptance of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (1969), which was based on prolonged studies by
the International Law Commission of the United Nations. 4 2
The various proposals granting the International Court of Justice
jurisdiction to deal with constitutional and operational activities of
the United Nations under the Charter have often had far-reaching
political overtones. Soon after the organization's founding, the first
substantive debates took place in the second part of the first session,
which was held in New York beginning on October 23, 1946. The
problem of South Africa's treatment of racial minorities, which still

occupies the attention of many of the organs of the United Nations,
was raised at this session by India's complaint of the treatment of
Indians in the Union of South Africa. This case had special
characteristics since it involved certain agreements between India and
South Africa. A prime question at that time, as subsequently it has
been in problems affecting other countries, was whether the matter
was "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of South Africa
and, therefore, beyond the competence of the United Nations to
"intervene" in light of the restrictive provisions of article 2, paragraph
7 of the Charter. The legal technicalities of the interpretation of this
Charter provision will be omitted in this article, but it should be
observed that the United States generally has been favorable to the
competence of the General Assembly to discuss a matter without
commitment to that organ's right to decide on remedial steps or
enforcement action.
In this first case, Field Marshall Smuts spoke for South Africa. He
said that, while South Africa did not admit the right of the United
Nations to intervene in this matter, his country did not object to
discussion of the problem. Smuts submitted a draft resolution under
which the General Assembly would have asked the Court to decide
whether the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
South Africa.
Colombia then submitted a draft resolution, which, had it been
adopted, might well have clarified subsequent debates about the

42. The text of the Convention is reproduced in 63 AM.
(1969).

J. INT'L

L. 875
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apartheid policies of South Africa. The Colombian draft posed the
following questions:
(a) Whether the Members of the United Nations, in accordance with the
Preamble and Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter, are under obligation to
amend immediately their internal legislation when it establishes racial
discrimination incompatible with the text of the Charter?
(b) Whether the Members of the United Nations are entitled in the future
to enact internal legislation embodying racial discrimination?
(c) Whether laws of racial discrimination constitute, or may be alleged by
States to constitute, matters of internal jurisdiction on which the General
Assembly is debarred from making recommendations to the State or States
concerned,
to the Security Council or to the Economic and Social
4
Council? 3
The United States supported the South African draft resolution,
emphasizing the importance of South Africa's avowed willingness to
"accept the opinion of an impartial tribunal." Such willingness was
not so apparent in later situations involving the treatment of black
Africans. The position of the United States was stated by Charles
Fahy, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, who as Solicitor
General had been an adviser to the United States delegation at the San
Francisco Conference of 1945. He argued the position of the United
States in both the committee and in the plenary session. Resort to the
Court, Fahy said,
is the best possible manner of removing the legal controversy from the
contending winds of political adjudication, which would forever cloud the
decision made and leave the innocent parties most directly concerned, the
Indians in South Africa, the victims of the resistance which would follow an
effort to ameliorate their condition by a decision made here in the form of
political controversy,
leaving unsolved the underlying question of legal
44
obligation.

The United States joined Great Britain and Sweden in proposing an
amended text of the draft resolution calling for a submission of the
question to the Court, and South Africa withdrew its draft in favor of
this proposal. France and Mexico, however, submitted an alternative
draft that merely expressed the conclusion that South Africa should
act in conformity with its international obligations and requested the
two governments to report to the next session of the General
Assembly. This innocuous resolution was adopted in committee by a
vote of 24 to 19, with 6 abstentions. When South Africa recommended the United States-British-Swedish draft in plenary session, this

43. U.N. Doc. A/C.1&6/13 (1946).
44. 1 U.N. GAOR 1012 (1946).
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was rejected by a 32-15-7 vote, and the bromidic text was adopted.4
The searching Colombian draft fell by the wayside.
It may be well to note here that the United States similarly
supported a 1947 Security Council proposal by Belgium to submit to
the Court for an advisory opinion the question of whether the

Indonesian problem was, as the Dutch claimed, an essentially domestic
question. In explanation, Ambassador Herschel Johnson said that the
United States had "no doubts whatever concerning the Security
Council's competence and authority to issue an order to cease
hostilities--no doubts whatever. What concerns us is the question as to
whether the Security Council has competence to impose a particular
method of peaceful settlement in a case of this type."'4 6 Since other
members of the Council had divergent views, the United States
favored submission of the whole problem to the Court. The resolution
was defeated by a vote of four to one, with six abstentions.4 7
Just as the South African question has continued to plague the
United Nations, so has the intractable problem of the Middle East,
which was referred to as "the question of Palestine" during the
1940's. It was one of my official assignments over a period of years
and sometimes an agonizing task. Even during the past several years,
there have been repeated discussions of the desirability of submitting
to the International Court of Justice a request for an advisory opinion
on various aspects of the problem-access to the Gulf of Aqaba
through the Straits of Tiran; the right of passage through the Suez
Canal; whether belligerent rights persist under an armistice; whether
under international law today any title to territory can be acquired by
conquest; the rights of the United Nations to its properties that have
been occupied or used by the Israeli Government; and the status of
Jerusalem. No one can assert with assurance whether earlier proposals
for resort to the Court would have contributed to some solutions. I
regret that the United States, which has always been so bemused by
the Middle Eastern problem, has not been more assertive of its
advocacy of a judicial settlement that it evinced in other cases.
In 1947, I was not in government service. That was the year in
which the General Assembly, notified by Great Britain that it

intended to relinquish its mandate over Palestine in 1948, adopted
what was called the "Plan of Partition with Economic Union." In the
course of the debate in a special subcommittee of the General
Assembly, the Arab states proposed that the International Court of

45. 1 U.N. GAOR 1007-10, 1061 (1946.
46. 2 U.N. SCOR 2222 (1947).
47. 2 U.N. SCOR 2224 (1947).
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Justice be asked for an advisory opinion on eight legal questions
connected with this rather elaborate plan. Two of the crucial
questions dealt with the competence of the United Nations to
recommend or enforce any plan concerning the future government of
Palestine, especially any plan that might be contrary to the wishes of
the inhabitants of Palestine. It is not necessary to record all of the
details of the questions posed but, at the request of France, a
preliminary vote was taken on seven questions that the Arab states
proposed to submit to the Court, including a question that read:
Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the two
plans and recommendations of the majority or minority of the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or any other solution involving
partition of the territory which is contrary to the
wishes, or adopted
48
without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine?
The proposal to refer these questions to the Court was rejected by a
vote of 25 to 18, with 11 abstentions. A vote then was taken on this
final question:
Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to
enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the
constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of
partition which is contrary to 4the
wishes, or adopted without the consent
9
of, the inhabitants of Palestine?
This last proposal was defeated by a narrower margin of 21 to 20,
with 13 abstentions. Eventually, on November 29, 1947, the plenary
meeting of the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 33 to 13, with
10 abstentions, a resolution incorporating the "Plan of Partition with
Economic Union." Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. voted in
favor of this plan.' 0 I have not had access to the official records for
this period and the statements made by the United States Representative do not reveal the background of the policy that induced the
United States to vote against the adoption of all the proposals to refer
the questions to the International Court for an advisory opinion.' 1
Nineteen forty-eight was a crucial and a bloody year in the history
of Palestine; an account of it is not within the scope of this article.
Suffice it to say that on May 22, 1948, the United States Consul
General, Thomas Wasson, was killed by a sniper's bullet while

48. 2 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Palestine Question 203 (1947).
49. 2 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Palestine Question 203 (1947).
50. 2 U.N. GAOR 1424-25 (1947).
51. The 1947 annual Report by the President to Congress on U.S. activities in
the United Nations devotes 15 pages to the Palestine issue, but does not reveal the
reasons for this position of the United States.
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returning from a meeting of the Truce Commission established by the
Security Council and composed of those members of the Security
Council that had career consular officers in Jerusalem. 2 On September 18, 1948, Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, was
assassinated in Jerusalem two days after he submitted the comprehensive Bernadotte Plan for attaining peace in the area. Meanwhile, on
May 14, 1948, the British mandate for Palestine expired and the
Provisional Government of Israel proclaimed the independence of the
State of Israel, which President Truman immediately recognized.
In the summer of 1948, the Security Council busily sought to
secure compliance with cease-fires and truces. In July, 1948, just

before the adoption of the most far-reaching Council resolution, Syria
introduced a draft resolution to request the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion regarding the international legal
status of Palestine upon the termination of the British mandate. The
United States Government during this period was in favor of referring
various questions to the Court, but the recognition of the State of
Israel explains why I, as the United States Representative on the
Security Council, was instructed not to support the Syrian proposal.
After noting that the United States agreed with certain statements
already made by the Canadian and French Representatives, I made the
following uninspiring statement:
I should merely like to emphasize our belief that the procedure suggested by
the Syrian draft resolution follows a line different from that which the
Security Council and the General Assembly are pursuing in regard to the
Palestine question. It may be that a proposal made at the special session of
the General Assembly to submit this whole question to the International
Court of Justice would have been very pertinent at that time, but that
proposal was not the one which the General Assembly acted upon and
accepted. The General Assembly did adopt a resolution providing for the
selection of a United Nations Mediator to promote a peaceful adjustment of
the future situation of Palestine. This problem is one with which the
General Assembly has dealt on a number of occasions.
The function of the Security Council, in my opinion, is primarily one of
seeing that peace is maintained, and to that end, of assisting in the general
programme laid down by the General Assembly through the aid which we
are currently giving to the United Nations Mediator.
For these reasons the delegation of the United States is not prepared
to
53
support the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Syria.
52. Members with such officers were Belgium, France, the United States and
Syria. This formula for the composition of the Commission eliminated the Soviet

Union just as had been done in setting up the Consular Commission in Indonesia.
Syria declined to serve on the Palestine Truce Commission.
53. 3 U.N. SCOR, No. 98, 14-15 (1948).
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Syria made one more effort, again without success, to secure from
the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion on one aspect
of the situation in Palestine, i.e., the status of the Palestinian refugees,
and their right to repatriation and return of their property. The
proposal was made on December 10, 1952, in the General Assembly's
Ad Hoc Political Committee. Once again, it may be said that if the
position taken by the Arab states had been supported by an advisory
opinion of the Court (of course the Court's opinion might have been
to the contrary), the United States might have found in such a judicial
pronouncement the basis for taking a firmer stand in the interests of
those hapless people whose deplorable condition still constitutes one
of the aggravating elements in the chaotic Middle East crisis--for a
crisis it still remains. But, as stated in the Report by the President to
the Congress for the Year 1952:
The role of the United States in the Committee debate was different from
that in previous years in that the United States, while supporting direct
negotiations between the parties, [which the Arabs consistently opposed]
did not take any active lead in the debate and did not sponsor a resolution.
When the Syrian proposal was voted on December 11, 1952, the
United States was one of the 19 states that abstained, while 26 votes
were negative and only 13 in favor. There was no roll-call and no
statement was made on behalf of the United States.

It seems relevant to mention briefly another matter arising in the
Middle East and connected with the use of the International Court,
although it was a procedural question involving an interpretation of
article 27 of the Charter, which provides that in certain situations a
member of the Security Council that is also a party to a dispute
considered by the Council "shall abstain from voting." The factual
situation before the Council was Egypt's placing of restrictions in
April, 1951, on passage of ships through the Suez Canal. Egypt relied
on involved legal and technical arguments, but it was not a member of
the Council and, therefore, could not itself introduce a resolution.
Egypt did, in the course of the debates, suggest that the Council
should ask the International Court for an advisory opinion on the
question whether five members of the Council (including the United
States), which were said to be parties to the dispute with Egypt,
should abstain from voting. Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson
telephoned Ambassador Gross, who was representing the United
States on the Council, and told him to oppose any effort to have the
matter sent to the Court. Hickerson said that if the proposal were
formally introduced, however, the United States should abstain if it
were certain that the proposal would not get the seven votes necessary
for approval. When Egypt found that if such a resolution were
introduced it could not possibly secure the votes necessary for
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adoption, it dropped the proposal. It is a pity that the United States
did not advocate submitting the substantive legal questions to the
Court. Instead, the United States joined England and France in
sponsoring a resolution which held that the Egyptian restrictions were
not justified and should be removed.
Another matter that had its origin in the period of intense violence
in Palestine during 1948 did, in fact, result in reference to the
International Court of a request for an advisory opinion, which--when
delivered-was of outstanding importance in the development of the
international law applicable to international organizations. It has been
noted that the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, was
assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948. Ralph Bunche,
personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who was to succeed Count Bernadotte as Acting Mediator,
immediately reported the matter to Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister
of the Provisional Government of Israel. Bunche asserted that the act
was committed by "Jewish assailants" and that under the circumstances, the "provisional Government of Israel must assume full

responsibility" for the act. 5 4 At a September 18 emergency meeting
of the Security Council to consider the matter, I stated, as
Representative of the United States, that the authorities concerned
were now most sharply reminded of their responsibility to discharge
their duty of controlling the lawless members of their own group.
Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, noted that
there had now been seven U.N. representatives killed in the line of
duty during the hostilities in the Middle East: "Their murder can only
be interpreted as a direct act of attempted interference with the effort
of the United Nations to settle the Palestine question."' I The
Secretary-General followed up by putting on the agenda of the third
session of the General Assembly in Paris the question of the right of
the United Nations to demand reparation for injuries to its agents.
Trygve Lie himself had no doubt that the organization had that right,
but it was a disputed legal point. The State Department instructed the
United States delegation to vote in favor of a request to the Court for
an advisory opinion on the subject. The delegation was told that it
need not make a statement on the subject since the proposal was sure
to be approved in plenary session. However, John Maktos, as U.S.
Representative in the Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee, spoke
several times in favor of the proposal. He said, "In the opinion of the
54. 3 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Oct. 1948, at 1, U.N. Doc. Sf1004 (1948); see
Wright, Responsibility for Injuries to United Nations Officials, 43 AM. J. INT'L
L. 95 (1949).
55. 3 U.N. SCOR, No. 11, at 3 (1948).
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United States Delegation, existing rules of international law permitted
a State to be held responsible to the United Nations," but in view of
divergencies of opinion among the delegations, "it would be advisable
to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on

the question."" Maktos said that he "personally had no doubt but
that the United Nations was entitled to present an international claim
as a result of the violation of international law by a State."' I
The Sixth Committee recommended to the General Assembly a
resolution requesting the Court for an opinion. The Assembly
unanimously adopted the resolution on December 3, 1948.1 8 There
was no roll-call, but the United States was in favor of the result. The
Court gave its opinion on April 11, 1949, and held unanimously that
the United Nations, as an organization, had the right to bring a claim
against the responsible government with a view to obtaining the
reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the United
Nations." 9 By a vote of eleven to four, it likewise held that the United
Nations could present a claim on behalf of the victim in respect of the
damage caused to him. The juridical significance of the opinion lies in
the Court's conclusion that the United Nations, while not a state, is an
international person and, therefore, a subject of international law
capable of possessing legal rights.
Following the Court's opinion, the Secretary-General submitted to
the next session of the General Assembly in 1949, proposals regarding
the appropriate action to be taken. On December 1, 1949, the General
Assembly authorized him to bring claims against states alleged to be
responsible for injuries to U.N. agents. Mr. Maktos, speaking for the
United States, declared that his government accepted the Court's
opinion, although it had earlier held an opposing view. Actually, the
State Department's view had been set forth, not in the usual form of a
written statement to the Court, but rather in a letter to the Registrar
from Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser. Relying on the traditional
legal theory that an international claim is based on an injury to a state
through an injury to one of its citizens, the Department took the
position that the United Nations could not bring a claim on behalf of

the heirs or beneficiaries of the injured individual. Tate said that if the
individual or those entitled through him were stateless, however, there
was no reason why the United Nations should not present the

56. 3 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 566 (1948).
57. 3 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 559 (1948).
58. 3 U.N. SCOR 690 (1948).
59. Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
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claim. 6 It is noteworthy that throughout these various debates on
the question of applicable legal principal, there was neither a direct
nor indirect identification of the state alleged to be responsible for
Count Bernadotte's death.
At the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950, the

Secretary-General reported on the action that he had taken; he was
then forced to be specific. He reported that in connection with the
death of Count Bernadotte, he had addressed to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Israel a request for a formal apology, a continuation
and intensification of the Israeli Government's efforts to apprehend
and bring to justice the perpetrators of the crime, and the payment of
54,628 dollars as reparation for the monetary damage borne by the
United Nations. No claim was made for Count Bernadotte's widow
because she did not wish such a claim to be presented. In its reply, the
Israeli Government admitted that it had been at fault in some respects
and expressed "its most sincere regret that this dastardly assassination
took place on Israeli territory." It expressed doubt that further steps
would disclose the identity of the perpetrators, but emphasized that it
did not consider the case closed and would act upon
any new
6
evidence. A check for the stipulated amount was enclosed. 1
Although it is not a Palestinian case, the geographical nexus makes
it appropriate to mention here a matter that Egypt brought before the
Security Council in July, 1947. Egypt complained of the continued
presence of British troops on Egyptian soil, contrary to the will of
Egypt. Great Britain relied on a treaty of 1836, which authorized the
stationing of the troops. Egypt, however, insisted that the treaty was
no longer in effect and that the presence of the troops was a cause of
friction and a threat to the peace. Brazil submitted a draft resolution
recommending that the parties utilize peaceful methods of adjustment, as stipulated in article 33 of the Charter. Belgium submitted an
amendment to the Brazilian draft, which specifically mentioned the
possibility of resorting to the International Court of Justice to
determine the validity of the treaty of 1836. This was not, therefore,
an instance in which there was an attempt to secure an advisory

opinion, but rather a recommendation to the parties. The United
Kingdom attached great importance to this Belgian proposal and the

60. Letter from the Secretary of State of the United States of America to the
Registrar of the International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Pleadings 19, 22
(1949).
61. 5 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 50, U.N. Doc. A/1347 (1950).
There is a useful account in SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW (1956).
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United States likewise supported it. Ambassador Herschel Johnson
tried to persuade the Egyptians to agree, arguing:
there is no reason why it should be expected that the International Court
of Justice would necessarily take an entirely technical view. Even if the
International Court of Justice should rule, contrary to the Egyptian
contention, that the treaty is technically valid, there would be nothing to
preclude pursuance of the case along other lines. In my opinion, if such a
ruling were forthcoming, the United Kingdom
might well renounce any
62
rights it held under such a technical finding.
Nonetheless, only Belgium, the United States, Australia and France
voted for the Belgian amendment; six members of the Security
Council abstained and Britain did not participate in the vote. 6 3 The
case illustrates- early attitudes toward the Court and contrasts with

subsequent efforts of the Arab states to secure advisory opinions on
aspects of the Palestine question.
Another instance during 1947 in which the Security Council
actually adopted a resolution urging the parties to take a dispute to
the International Court of Justice was the Corfu Channel Case.6 4
British warships on mine-sweeping patrol in the Corfu Channel struck
mines that Great Britain asserted had been planted there by Albania.
The British delegation introduced a draft resolution on April 3, 1947,
urging the parties to take the case to the International Court.
Ambassador Herschel Johnson of the United States said that his
Government "wholeheartedly supports this resolution." '6 s The resolution was adopted by a vote of eight to zero, with two abstentions; the
United Kingdom did not participate in the vote. When the case did go
to the Court, it rendered its first judgment on March 25, 1948.66 The
Court held Albania responsible for the Corfu Channel incident, but
that state refused to pay the damages assessed by the Court. This was
the only instance in all the years of the existence of a permanent
international court that there has been a flat refusal to comply with a
judgment.
By 1948, there was already a "cold war" atmosphere surrounding
various attempts to use the International Court. One such case arose
when the Soviet Union refused to allow one of its nationals, a woman
married to the son of the Chilean Ambassador in Moscow, to leave the
U.S.S.R. with her husband. Chile, in negotiations with the Soviet
Government, offered to submit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

2 U.N. SCOR 2296 (1947).
2 U.N. SCOR 2303 (1947).
The Corfu Channel Case, [1948] I.C.J. 53.
2 U.N. SCOR 686 (1947).
[1948] I.C.J. 15.
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or to the International Court of Justice the question of the wife's right

to accompany her husband. When the offer was rejected, Chile placed
the question on the agenda of the General Assembly. Australia
introduced a draft resolution calling on the Assembly to submit to the
International Court a rather general question regarding the extent of
the privileges and immunities of members of the family of a
diplomatic officer. The United States had a special interest in the
question because there were 350 Soviet wives and 65 Soviet husbands
of American citizens who had been denied the right to leave the Soviet
Union. The State Department instructed the United States delegation
to suggest to other delegations the desirability of referral to the Court,
but it found a majority opposed. Acting in accordance with what is
known as a State Department "position paper," Durward Sandifer of
UNA urged at a U.S. delegation meeting in New York on September
29, 1948, that the United States should push the proposal. Ambassador Gross doubted whether there was a rule of international law under
which a diplomat's wife could claim the right to leave her country. In
addition, he noted that the Court might well rule that the Soviet
action was not illegal. Nonetheless, the position paper was approved.
Ambassador Gross, speaking in the Sixth Committee for the United
States, deplored the Soviet Government's rejection of the Chilean
offer to submit the matter to judicial settlement.6 7 Just before the
adjournment for Christmas, 1948, the Australian draft resolution was
defeated by a vote of thirteen to nine, with twelve abstentions.
Although it cannot be classified strictly as a "cold war" item,
another important question involving an East-West confrontation
attracted attention in United Nations circles in 1949. The background
lay in discussions at the Yalta Conference of 1945 concerning the
future freedoms of people who had been under German domination
during the Second World War. In the peace treaties with the former
Axis countries of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, those states
undertook to secure to all persons in their jurisdiction "without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of
human rights and of the fundamental human freedoms, including
freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship,
of political opinion and of public meeting.",6 8 Under the pretext of
eliminating Nazi and Fascist organizations-a point on which Stalin
had been happy to agree at Yalta--the Communist governments of the
67. 3 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 738 (1948).
68. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 2, 61 Stat. 1915, T.I.A.S.
No. 1650, 41 U.N.T.S. 21; Peace Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 2, 61
Stat. 2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651, 41 U.N.T.S. 135; Peace Treaty with Romania,

Feb. 10, 1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1649, 42 U.N.T.S. 3.
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three countries adopted policies that the United States challenged as
being systematic violations of human rights. General indignation was
aroused early in 1949, following the imprisonment and trial of
Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary and of the Protestant churchmen in
Bulgaria. 6 9
The peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania contained
rather elaborate provisions for the settlement of disputes arising under
their provisions. After direct diplomatic negotiations had failed, the
United States invoked those procedures beginning with the specified
meeting of the Ambassadors of the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the three Balkan capitals. The
Soviet Government refused to participate in such meetings and
alleged, inter alia, that the matters complained of were within the

domestic jurisdiction of the states concerned. The United States then
asked the three governments to proceed with the appointment of the
commissions that also were provided for in the peace treaties. The
three governments refused.
The General Assembly met in New York from April 5 to May 18,
1949, in continuation of the third regular session that had been held
in Paris. Bolivia and Australia placed on the agenda the violation of
human rights in Hungary and Bulgaria, with special reference to the
trials of the churchmen. The State Department informed the United
States Mission in New York that it would be preferable to exhaust the
peace treaty procedures before resorting to the U.N. The Latin
American states were particularly incensed with this policy and the
United States staff had difficulty in dissuading Cuba from bringing the
case at once to the Security Council. The arguments at the spring
session were largely concerned with the issue of the competence of the
United Nations to deal with a matter that the Slav states insisted was
purely domestic. While it sought to give priority to the treaty
procedures, the United States argued in favor of U.N. competence,
especially in view of the provisions of the peace treaties. It joined
Bolivia in sponsoring a resolution that noted with concern the charges
made, reminded Bulgaria and Hungary of their obligations under the
treaties and kept the question on the agenda for the next session. Only
the six Slav delegations voted against the resolution, while nine states
abstained.
When the fourth regular session of the General Assembly met on
September 20, 1949, the United States had decided that there was no
hope of getting action under the peace treaty procedures and,
therefore, that there should be a request for an advisory opinion from
the International Court of Justice. One question involved the right
69. The Cardinal finally returned to the Vatican in 1971.
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of the Secretary-General to appoint a third member to the commissions specified in the treaties who would be authorized to pass on the
issues in conjunction with a commissioner named by the Western
Powers, when the Balkan states refused to name their own commissioner in accordance with the treaty procedure. Abraham Feller of the
U.N. Secretariat told the United States delegation on the day after the
Assembly convened that they were studying the question. On that
same day, the United Kingdom put forward a draft resolution
requesting on advisory opinion from the Court. The United States
supported the move, as did many other delegations, but there were the
usual discussions about the drafting of the resolution. Professor
Manley 0. Hudson, a former judge of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, was consulted by the United States delegation
on the phrasing of the text. On October 3, the issues were described in
detail by David Popper of UNA for the benefit of the political officers
of the United States delegation, who have the duty to explain their
delegation's position to members of other delegations. At a U.S.
delegation meeting on that same day, Eric Stein, a State Department
specialist on security affairs, explained the resolution that the United
States was to introduce jointly with Bolivia and Canada. The
resolution would pose four questions: first, whether disputes existed
that were subject to solution by the peace treaty procedures; second,
whether all the signatories were bound to resort to those procedures
and to appoint their commissioners; third, if the Court answered the
first two questions in the affirmative, whether the Secretary-General
could then appoint a third commissioner; and, finally, whether a
commission composed of two members would be competent to make
a binding decision settling the dispute. I objected to putting
contingent questions to the Court in this fashion and wondered
whether we could provide for use of the Interim Committee of the
General Assembly, which might interpret for the Secretary-General
the Court's opinion on the first two points. Leonard Meeker, Assistant
Legal Adviser, said that the State Department had prepared a draft
which provided that the Interim Committee should consider the
Court's answers to the first two questions and decide whether it was
advisable to ask the Court to answer the last two questions. Meeker
noted, however, that the Department preferred to leave the matter
with the Secretary-General. At a further meeting of the U.S.
delegation on the following day, the resolution was approved after
some minor redrafting. On October 22, the resolution was adopted by
the General Assembly by a vote of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions.7 0 The
case for the United States was stated fully by Benjamin V. Cohen, a
70. 4 U.N. GAOR 150 (1949).
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member of the U.S. delegation and a veteran in U.N. affairs. He said
that the United States was prepared to accept the Court's opinions as
binding and hoped that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania would do
likewise. 7 1 In the State Department, Sandifer of UNA and Thompson
of EUR told Fisher, the Legal Adviser, that this case was highly
important for the United States because it had initiated and
co-sponsored the request for an advisory opinion. The Deputy Legal
Adviser, Jack Tate, prepared a memorandum that Fisher sent to Under
Secretary of State Webb, stating that the task of preparing our
argument before the Court was a big one and he would need to hire
extra help. The United States was among those states that filed both
written and oral statements with the Court.
The Court rendered its opinion on March 30, 1950. The Court
answered the first two questions in the affirmative, but, in response to
the third question, held that the Secretary-General was not entitled to
appoint a third commissioner in the case envisaged. At the fifth

session of the General Assembly in 1950, Mr. Cohen again spoke for
the United States and declared that it would abide by the Court's
opinions "in letter and spirit," although it did not agree with the
answer to the third question.7 2 His speech in the plenary session was a
blistering attack on the policies of the Soviet Union and its satellites.
Following the Court's opinion, the General Assembly was impotent to
proceed further to secure respect for human rights in these three
Balkan states. Its resolution of October 5, 1950, took note of the
advisory opinions of the Court, condemned "the wilful refusal of the
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to carry out their
obligations under the peace treaties," and expressed the opinion that
those governments were "callously indifferent to the sentiments of the
world community." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 35 to 5,
with 13 abstentions, in the Ad Hoc Committee and by a vote of 40 to
5, with 12 abstentions, in plenary session on November 3, 1950." 3
As I noted earlier, the General Assembly in 1946 had soft-pedalled
the Indian complaint of the treatment of its nationals in South Africa
and had avoided referring the basic issues of racial discrimination to
the International Court of Justice. In that first year of the life of the
United Nations, governments were still unsure of the role that the
Court might play. In the United States, the uncertainty may have been
even greater than it was in some other countries, since we had not
shared in the experience of the League of Nations, where the Council
of the League had abundantly used the advisory opinions of the
71. 4 U.N. GAOR 132 (1949).
72. 5 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 10 (1950). See also id. at 40.
73. 5 U.N. GAOR 368 (1950).
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Permanent Court of International Justice as an aid to the solution of
various political controversies arising from the new territorial and
political alignments created at Versailles, Trianon and St. Germain. By
1949, however, views about the Court had become clearer and in that
year the United Nations began a long series of efforts to use the Court
as an aid to the solution of the problems raised by South Africa's
administration of the territory of South West Africa, which it held
under a League of Nations mandate. A number of attempts were made
to induce the South African Government to abandon its policy of
apartheid, which denied to the black and "colored" populations of
South West Africa the "material and moral well-being and ...social

progress" that the terms of the mandate required the mandatory to
promote "to the utmost" in discharging the "sacred trust of
civilization" referred to in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations.' 4 This series of cases will be described here before returning
chronologically to other invocations of the judicial process in 1949.
In 1947, the Union of South Africa gave an undertaking to submit
reports on its administration of South West Africa to the United
Nations and, in 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
recommending that such reports should continue to be filed annually
in order that the Trusteeship Council could keep in touch with the
situation. In July, 1949, South Africa informed the Secretary-General
that no further reports would be submitted, which led to long debates
in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly-the Committee
charged to deal with territories under trusteeship and other dependent
territories. After a good deal of controversy, it was decided that a
hearing should be given to representatives of indigenous groups from
South West Africa. The delegations of Denmark, Norway, Syria and
Thailand then submitted a draft resolution that would ask the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion concerning the
international status of the territory of South West Africa and the
nature of South Africa's international obligations thereto. At that
point, there ensued a long process of submission of textual amendments, discussions of them, and votes on particular words and phrases.
In the course of the debates, Mr. Fahy for the United States spoke in
favor of asking the Court for such an opinion because his delegation
"was firmly convinced that an advisory opinion given by the
International Court of Justice would be profoundly wise and would
enable the General Assembly to determine what relations should exist
74. My own opinion about South Africa's violations of its obligations under
the mandate is set out in my Dissenting Opinion to the Judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 1, at
323-442. The issues will not be reargued here.
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between South West Africa and the international community." ' I On
December 2, 1949, the United States delegation decided to propose
further textual amendments; when these were not adopted, the United
States abstained in the final committee vote in which the resolution
was adopted by 30 to 7, with 9 abstentions. 7 6 In the plenary session,
the United States and sixteen other members proposed an amendment
that restored language rejected in the Fourth Committee; the
amendment was adopted by a vote of 39 to 6, with 7 members
abstaining, after which, on December 6, the amended draft was
adopted by a vote of 40 to 7, with 4 abstentions. 7 7 In the debate
leading up to the vote, a long statement explaining the position of
South Africa was made by one of its ablest and most fair-minded
representatives, Ambassador Jooste. 7 1 He stated that South Africa
believed implicitly in the rule of law. Nevertheless, by the manner that
the draft resolution was framed and in light of the debate in the
Fourth Committee, it was evident that an opinion of the Court that
was contrary to the views of his Government would not be respected
and that political considerations would dominate legal ones. Mr. Fahy,
for the United States, favored further amendment of the draft
resolution and insisted that legal and political issues should not be
mixed. A provision of the draft resolution to which the United States
objected was adopted by the close vote of 21 to 20, with 11
abstentions, after which the United States joined in the favorable vote
of 40 to 7, with 4 abstentions on the resolution as a whole. Such a

final swallowing of an entire text disapproved of in part is not unusual
in United Nations proceedings, and the United States delegation had
decided in advance that it would approve of reference to the Court,
even if its amendments to the text of the resolution were defeated.
The United States was one of five states that submitted to the
Court their views on the questions asked. The Court's opinion,
delivered on June 11, 1950, affirmed the basic proposition that South
West Africa was a territory under the mandate and that South Africa
continued to have international obligations with respect to the
territory, including the obligation to submit reports and to transmit
petitions to the United Nations. 7 9 The Court's opinion was considered in the Fourth Committee of the fifth General Assembly.
Eventually, a vote was taken on a draft resolution sponsored by the
75. 4 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 276 (1949).
76. 4 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 282 (1949).
77. 4 U.N. GAOR 537 (1949).
78. 4 U.N. GAOR 523-29 (1949).
79. Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, [1950]
I.C.J. 128.
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United States, together with Brazil, Denmark, Peru, Syria and
Thailand. The resolution specified that "the General Assembly accepts
the advisory opinion," urged the South African Government to give
effect to it, and, as the United States especially urged, appointed a
committee of five to confer with South Africa on the necessary
procedural measures. This resolution was adopted on December 13,
1950, by a vote of 45 to 6, with 5 abstentions. 8 0
The United States served on the Special Committee on South West
Africa, which made a report to the General Assembly on procedures
for dealing with matters affecting that mandated area. It was during
the debates in that Committee that the Legal Adviser, Adrian Fisher,
sent a memorandum that was drafted in part by Leonard Meeker to
Jack Hickerson, then Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations
Affairs. The memorandum of October 3, 1952, dealt with a proposed
Arab-Asian item on the agenda of the General Assembly concerning
racial relations in South Africa. The Legal Adviser was of the opinion
that the General Assembly would have jurisdiction to pass a resolution
disapproving of the racial policies of South Africa and that this would
not constitute an "intervention" or otherwise violate article 2,
paragraph 7 of the Charter. Fisher felt that if the question of
jurisdiction were raised in the General Assembly, the United States
should so state and should add that although no advisory opinion was
needed, the United States, given its general policy of favoring resort to
the Court, would not object if others wished to make such a request.
Finally, Fisher believed that the United States should take the
position, as part of the over-all policy of support for the effective
functioning of the Court, that all members of the United Nations
ought to give the Court all possible help.' 1
One specific question that came up in the same Committee on
South West Africa was the nature of the voting procedure in the
General Assembly that should be adopted in order to assure
compliance with some of the specifications in the Court's advisory
opinion of 1950. The United States, along with India, Mexico,
Norway and Syria, sponsored in the General Assembly in 1954 a draft
resolution to ask the Court for another advisory opinion on the
question of whether the Committee's proposal concerning voting
procedure would be in compliance with the Court's previous opinion.
On November 8, 1954, the U.S.-supported recommendation to seek an
advisory opinion was defeated in the Fourth Committee by a vote of
eighteen to eighteen, with sixteen abstentions. In the plenary meeting
80. 5 U.N. GAOR 628-29 (1950).
81. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OPINIONS
2, at 308 (1952) (unpublished).
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on November 23, however, a draft resolution calling for an advisory
opinion carried by a vote of 25 to 11, with 21 abstentions.8 2 The
United States voted in favor, but did not speak in the final debate.
The United States was one of three countries that submitted
written statements to the Court. Other governments merely referred
to the views that their representatives had expressed in the debates in
the General Assembly. The Court gave its unanimous advisory opinion
on June 7, 1955, stating that the General Assembly's proposed rule on
voting procedure was based on a correct interpretation of the Court's
advisory opinion of July 11, 1950.83 At the next meeting of the
General Assembly, the United States joined Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Thailand in submitting a draft resolution whereby
the General Assembly would accept and endorse the advisory opinion.
Laird Bell spoke briefly on behalf of the United States in support of
the resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 3, 1955, by 54 votes in favor, none opposed and 4
abstentions.8 4
In any review of the ways in which the services of the International
Court of Justice have been utilized in helping to solve political issues
before the General Assembly, it is interesting to note the meticulous
care with which the delegates sought to insure the avoidance of any
technical illegality in the procedures. The Court had hardly delivered
its opinion endorsing the General Assembly's voting procedures when
another dispute arose over the question whether oral hearings should
be granted to petitioners from South West Africa. The Court had
already indicated that the United Nations should, so far as possible,
follow the procedures of the League of Nations, and there was a
difference of opinion in the Fourth Committee concerning the
propriety of oral hearings. The United States at first co-sponsored a
resolution that would have denied the legality of oral hearings, while
proposing alternate procedures. When a resolution was introduced by
Mexico, Lebanon, Liberia and Thailand proposing that the issue be
82. 9 U.N. GAOR 326 (1954). It is one of the curiosities of the procedure of

the General Assembly that a vote in one of the committees may be so different
from a vote on the identical question in the plenary session. The explanation
sometimes is found in the free-wheeling operation of a member of a delegation in
the committee which may be reversed by the head of his delegation after a
persuasive conversation or a little "arm-twisting" on the part of the head of
another delegation which had taken the opposite position in the committee.

83. Advisory Opinion on the Voting Procedures on Question Relating to
Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Africa, [1955]
I.C.J. 67.
84. 10 U.N. GAOR 399 (1955).
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referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion,

however, the United States agreed and voted for the resolution. The
resolution submitting the question to the Court was adopted in the
plenary session on December 3, 1955, by 32 votes to 5, although there
were 19 abstentions.' I
The Court's advisory opinion was handed down on June 1, 1956,
and held, by eight votes to five, that the granting of oral hearings to
petitioners would be consistent with its previous opinion of July 11,
1950.86 After a normal series of arguments about the text of the
resolution, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on January 23,
1957, which again used the expression "accepts and endorses the
advisory opinion."8 " The United States cast one of the 60 votes in
favor; there were no opposing votes and nine abstentions.
Since this is not an attempt to write a history of South West Africa
(now known as "Namibia"), it is' sufficient to note that since
discussions with the Government of South Africa proved fruitless,
Ethiopia and Liberia filed contentious proceedings against South
Africa on October 28, 1960. When the President of the Court cast his
deciding vote on July 18, i966, to break the tie of 8 to 8, the Court,
in effect, gave support to the South African position.88 This is a
matter of history about which there is abundant literature. As
indicated earlier, the focus of this article is upon the position of the
United States on various proposals for advisory opinions from the
International Court. It is not germane to this particular study to trace
the attitude of the United States Government in opposing the position
of South Africa in regard to Namibia. The latest attempt to secure
judicial support for the almost worldwide effort to free Namibia from
South African domination and control is significant because for the
first time in the twenty-five years of the life of the United Nations,
the Security Council asked the Court for an advisory opinion. Due
largely to the initiative of Representative Jakobson of Finland, the
Security Council in February, 1970, established a special ad hoc
subcommittee to consider the Namibian situation. The debates turned
particularly on the validity of a General Assembly resolution that had
declared that South Africa had forfeited its right to continue as
mandatory and that the mandate was ended. The Security Council
endorsed the position of the General Assembly, which had declared
that the presence of South Africa in South West Africa was illegal and
85. Id.

86. Advisory Opinion on Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the
Committee on South West Africa, [1956] I.C.J. 23.
87. 11 U.N. GAOR 967 (1957).

88. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 4.
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that all of the South African acts in Namibia were void and of no
effect. The outcome of the debate in the Security Council was the
adoption on July 29, 1970, by a vote of twelve to zero, with three
abstentions, of a resolution asking the Court to give an advisory
opinion on the legal consequences for states of the continued presence
of South Africa in Namibia. 9 The United States supported the
proposal throughout and submitted to the Court not only a written

statement, but also full oral argument by the Legal Adviser, John
Stevenson.
The Court gave its opinion on June 21, 1971."0 Despite a flurry of
separate and dissenting opinions,, the Court's pronouncement was
clear:
(1) by thirteen votes to two, the Court held that the continued
presence.of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and that South Africa
is, accordingly, under an obligation to withdraw its administration
from Namibia and to end its occupation immediately;
(2) by eleven votes to four, the Court held that members of the
U.N. are obliged to recognize this illegality and the invalidity of
South African acts in Namibia and to refrain from any action
countenancing such acts; and
(3) by the same vote, the Court concluded that it is incumbent
on non-member states to assist in any action taken by the United
Nations with respect to Namibia.
The Court's opinion was discussed in the United Nations at some
length and the majority view was favorable to the result of the
Security Council's request. The Security Council opened a debate on
Namibia on September 27, 1971, and continued for five days
scattered through the next two weeks. The representative of France
criticized what he called "certain erroneous interpretations" of the
Charter in the opinion and denied flatly that the General Assembly
could make decisions which would be binding on states. The
representative of the United Kingdom said that the British Government could not accept the Court's conclusion that the General

Assembly had the competence to terminate the mandate. During the
General Assembly's debate on the Court's opinion, on October 4,
1971, Secretary of State Rogers said: "We have decided to accept the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal

89. 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 16 (1970); U.N. Doc. S/Res/284 (1970).
90. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa (Namibia), [1971] I.C.J. 16. [Ed.
Note: An extended discussion of this case is found on pages 213
through 242 infra.]
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consequences for States of South Africa's continuing occupation of
Namibia." 9 I
As this article is being written, the daily press is full of reports
about the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations, but gradually it is becoming understood that the question is
not that of "admitting" a new member but rather one of accepting the
credentials of one or another delegation, each of which purports to be

entitled to the place of "China" in the U.N. organization. Simultaneously, the General Assembly, rather pro forma, did admit to
membership the microstates of Bhutan, Bahrein and Qatar, bringing
the total membership to 130. Perhaps before these words are in print,
the United Nations will have acted on the wise recommendation of a
panel of the United Nations Association of the United States of
America that the organization should act on the "general principle of
the value of inclusiveness" by assuring a seat in the General Assembly
for the Republic of China on Taiwan and by admitting to membership
at the same time the Federal Republic of Germany, the German
Democratic Republic, North9 2 Korea and South Korea and North
Vietnam and South Vietnam.
At an earlier period in the history of the United Nations, the
question of admitting new members, singly or in groups, provoked
prolonged controversy. The issue was argued on technical grounds
involving the interpretation of the Charter and on diplomatic grounds in
terms of the probable increase in voting strengths of the two
blocs-Western and Eastern. The key to the legal situation is article 4
of the Charter, which reads as follows:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving
States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in
the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
It soon became apparent that in interpreting the words "peaceloving," "peace" was to be identified with either one or another state
or group of states. Thus, if state A "loved" the Soviet Union, the

United States and its friends questioned its love for peace, whereas
91. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1950, at 8 (1971).
1970's--A STRATEGY FOR A
18-19 (1971) (report of the
National Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the United
States of America) [hereinafter cited as THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
1970's].
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state B, which "loved" the United States, was in the eyes of the Soviet
Union a war-lover. Of course, this was not the terminology used in the
Assembly debates but, since the Soviet Union could veto the
application for membership of any state in the Security Council
without declaring the reasons for its opposition, a group of states
decided that it would be well to ask the International Court of Justice
for an opinion on the legal bases that would justify an adverse vote.
The lines had been drawn when in August, 1946, the United States
proposed the admission of eight states- -Afghanistan, Albania, Ireland,
Iceland, Outer Mongolia, Portugal, Sweden and Trans-Jordan-and the
Soviet Union proposed admitting Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
and Finland. When both Australia and the U.S.S.R. opposed the
United States "package," the United States withdrew its proposal.
When the Soviet Union advocated blanket admission for its five
candidates, however, the United States urged that each applicant
should be considered separately on its own merits. Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson spoke on the merits of certain of the U.S. candidates that
had not secured the necessary support of the Soviet Union in the
Security Council, and although he did not discuss a pending Belgian
draft resolution calling on the Court for an advisory opinion, that
resolution was adopted on November 17, 1947, by a vote of 40 to 8,
with 2 abstentions. 9 3 The United States made no oral argument, but
it was one of fifteen states to present a written argument to the Court.
The Court gave its opinion on May 28, 1948, with six judges
dissenting.9 4 It is one of the many instances in which those who
would denigrate the Court by asserting that its members vote purely
on political lines are baffled to explain how the dissenters included
such a mixed group as the judges from England, Canada, France,
Poland, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. The Court advised that when a
member of the United Nations is called upon to vote on the admission
of a state, it "is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the
admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by
paragraph 1"I I of article 4. Further, the Court ruled that when a
member recognizes that the conditions for admission set forth in
article 4 are satisfied, it cannot "subject its affirmative vote to the
that other States be admitted to membership" at
additional condition
96
the same time.

93.
94.
in the
95.
96.

2 U.N. GAOR 1078, U.N. Doc. A/471 (1947).
Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership
United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), [1948] I.C.J. 56.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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Amid a welter of resolutions, both general and particular, the
General Assembly in effect expressed the hope that the members of
the Security Council would be guided by the Court's opinion. Several
of the draft resolutions remarked pointedly that certain states had
received nine favorable votes in the Security Council, but that no
recommendation had been made to the General Assembly because of
the opposition of one of the permanent members of the Security
Council. (It was unnecessary to specifically name the U.S.S.R.). Many
of the resolutions asked the Council to reconsider the various
applications. The United States sponsored a special resolution in favor
of the admission of Austria, which had received one of the negative
votes. A special resolution sponsored by Australia favored the
admission of Ceylon, which the Soviet Union had challenged on the
ground that it was still a British appendage and not an independent
sovereign state. When the Security Council reconsidered the Ceylon
case at a meeting in Paris, I left the hospital to cast the United States'
vote in favor of admission, while the Soviet Union again vetoed.
Frustrated and irritated by the Soviet delegation's adamant refusal
to yield to the views of the vast majority of the members of the
United Nations, many delegates at the fourth session of the General
Assembly sought to find some way out of the impasse. Dr. Arce, the
eminent Buenos Aires surgeon, who was head of the Argentine
delegation to the General Assembly, tried to bring the diseased organ
under the knife-to cut out the veto from that principal organ known

as the Security Council. The Argentine thesis was based on an
interpretation of article 4 of the Charter to the effect that the article
left to the General Assembly the right to "decide" on admission to
membership, while the Security Council had only a right to
"recommend." Dr. Arce was a champion of the "sovereignty" of the
General Assembly, in which all members of the United Nations are
represented. The lawyers in the State Department, however, were not
convinced. Since the record of the ensuing debates in the U.S.
delegation is illustrative of the highly democratic process by which
decisions are reached and votes cast in certain situations, it seems
worthwhile to record it here. It should be observed, however, that to a
large extent the debate turned on tactics, whereas if a basic
substantive principle had been involved, more explicit instructions
would have been sent from Washington.
The record begins with a memorandum, or "position paper," dated
October 22, 1949. The memorandum concludes that the Security
Council was unlikely to be able to reach an agreement on a report
recommending the admission of new members. It added that the
United States was to continue its support for the admission of Jordan,
Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Korea and Nepal.
Winter, 1971
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The candidacies of these states had been sustained through a series of
Security Council meetings, but had been blocked by Soviet vetoes.
The Soviets were sponsoring the Mongolian People's Republic,
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. It has already been noted
why Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were in disfavor during that
period; furthermore, in the Security Council on September 15, 1949,
Albania and Mongolia received only the affirmative votes that were
cast by the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine. The Soviets suggested a package
deal by which all states approved by nine members of the Security
Council and by a majority of the General Assembly would be
admitted along with the five discredited Soviet candidates. The United
States memorandum reiterated the standard U.S. view that the U.N.
should be a universal organization, but that this result should not be
achieved by disregarding the criteria set forth in article 4 of the
Charter. This position was not overly rigorous since it implied that
while not all applicants could be admitted that year, the United States
would not take a position that would prejudice any later arrangement.
The United States position paper suggested that casual conversations
on the subject with the Soviet delegation were permissible, but that
the United States delegation should not take the initiative. If the
Soviets again proposed a package deal, the United States delegation
should oppose it, citing the reasons given by the International Court in
its advisory opinion. But the United States position in the General
Assembly should be moderate. Because the United States did not
agree with Dr. Arce's proposal, the United States delegation should
oppose any suggestion that the General Assembly could admit states
to membership even in the absence of a Security Council recommendation. If a proposal was made to ask the Court for an advisory
opinion on this point, the United States delegation should discourage
the idea in conversations with other delegates; if the issue came to a
vote, the United States should vote against it or abstain.
This position was debated by the United States delegation at a
meeting in New York on November 1, 1949. Paul Taylor began the
discussion by referring to the fact that the delegation had already
made it clear that it opposed the Argentine proposal of Dr. Arce. If
the Argentine delegation should press for an advisory opinion, the
United States should vote against it or abstain. Assistant Secretary of
State Jack Hickerson thought that the United States delegation should
tell Arce that it felt he was wrong, but that it would not object to
referring the question to the Court. On the other hand, Ambassador
Austin, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the
Chief of the U.S. delegation, liked Dr. Arce's proposal. Benjamin
Cohen, a specialist in matters of Charter interpretation and reference
to the Court, said that the text of a resolution referring the matter to
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the Court should not make any reference to the record of discussions
at San Francisco. Instead, the Court itself should take them into
consideration. He said that he would hesitate to send many important
constitutional questions to the Court before they had been thoroughly
aired in political debate. There was no use in submitting any question
to the Court unless that body could settle the issue with finality.
Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser of the Department, generally agreed with
Cohen, although if an amended resolution were proposed, he thought
that the United States should not vote against it. In general, Jack Tate,
Deputy Legal Adviser, thought it improper to "pass the buck" to the
Court except as a last resort. Sam Kopper, who maintained special
liaison with the Asian and Arab delegations, reported that they liked
the Arce proposal as a means of breaking the membership deadlock. If
a vote were taken on the proposal, however, he favored abstention.
James Hyde, with whom I agreed, urged that we vote in favor of
asking the Court for an advisory opinion, but also that we request Dr.
Arce to put his arguments in a brief before the Court rather than in
the draft resolution. Harley Notter, who had a leading role in the
pre-San Francisco planning of the United Nations Charter, suggested
that we be careful not to contravene our basic position that the Court
should be resorted to as frequently as possible. Furthermore, he felt
that the membership issue was a legitimate matter for judicial
determination. This was a strong statement from a devoted advocate
of the United Nations. Alternate Representative Wilson Compton and
Adviser Hayden Raynor, as well as Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who was a
member of the U.S. delegation, all supported Hyde's view. The
discussion ended with Cohen, Hickerson and myself urging further
talks with Arce, making it clear that we thought his view was incorrect
but not opposing a possible reference to the Court.
In the end, the resolution asked the Court the simple question
whether a state could be admitted to membership by the General
Assembly in the absence of a recommendation by the Security
Council. The resolution was adopted by 42 votes to 9, with the United
States voting with the majority.9 7 On March 3, 1950, the Court by
twelve votes to two answered the question in the negative. 9" There
were further attempts to secure from the Court some opinion that
would offset the Soviet vetoes, but they were ultimately abortive.
At the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950, there was
abundant debate on an issue of treaty procedure that was eventually

97. 4 U.N. GAOR 329 (1949).
98. Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4.
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referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
The controversy surrounded the fact that some multilateral conventions provided that ratifications should be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and that he should publish
from time to time the names of the states parties to the convention in
question. But in carrying out these duties, the Secretary-General often
faced a dilemma. After perhaps a dozen states had deposited their
notices of ratification, a thirteenth state might advise the SecretaryGeneral that it ratified the convention, but that it did not accept a
particular article and, therefore, made the reservation that it would
not be bound by that article. Some of the states that had already
ratified the treaty without reservation would inform the SecretaryGeneral that they did not agree with the thirteenth state, refuse to
accept its reservation and proclaim that it was not to be considered a
party to the treaty at all. The complications can be imagined. The
problem was first posed in the General Assembly in terms of broad
rules of international law regarding reservations to miltilateral treaties.
At that stage, Mr. Tate, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, argued that the whole issue should be referred for study to the
International Law Commission, which has a broad mandate to deal
with the codification of international law. Tate noted that while the
Commission was studying the matter, there would be no point in
asking the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion
on the subject. However, the issue soon crystalized around the
multilateral Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime' of Genocide. 9 9 When the question was thus narrowed, the
United States supported a reference to the International Court
because, as Tate explained, there was now a precise and concrete
question on which the Court could pass.
The questions put to the Court were actually quite complicated.
When the Court's equally complicated opinion was considered at the

sixth session of the General Assembly, the United States proposed a
draft resolution that provided that the General Assembly, "having
considered and noted" the opinion, as well as a report of the
International Law Commission, "commends" the opinion to all states,
"recommends" that all United Nations' organs be guided by it, and
"authorizes" the Secretary-General to follow certain specified
rules.1 00 Following amendments, the draft resolution recommended
that the drafters of multilateral conventions in the future should "bear
in mind" the desirability of inserting a clause dealing with the right to

99. 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (1951).
100. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.188 & Rev.1 (1951).
Vol. 5-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

make reservations. The amended resolution, in which the SecretaryGeneral was merely "invited" to follow certain rules, was adopted on
January 4, 1952, by a vote of 23 to 18, with 7 abstentions.1 01 In
speaking of the draft resolution in the Sixth Committee, Benjamin
Cohen explained that "it had been the general practice of the United
States to accept and follow the advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice, even when it had itself originally advanced different
views.,"'0 2 In this particular case, Cohen though that the reasoning of
the Court was sound. Subsequently, Mr. Maktos, speaking for the
United States, said that the opinion of the Court "had already become
part of international jurisprudence."' 03 On January 12, 1952, the
draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by a vote of 32 to 17, with
5 abstentions.1

04

Cohen's declaration that the United States generally accepted the
opinions of the Court even when it had had a contrary view was soon
put to a severe test. It was the McCarthy era and I do not pretend to
review the events of those unhappy years with scholarly objectivity.
Secretary-General Trygve Lie devotes a chapter of his autobiography
to The Communist Issue in the Secretariat. I agree with what he
wrote:
It was a cruel turn of fate that the Secretariat, the Delegations, and I should
have been battered by all the turmoil of highly charged emotions, mutual
misunderstandings and even recriminations in those months [of
1952-1953]. Being human, I of course made mistakes; but both blame and
praise came to me then for positions I did not take and beliefs I did not

share.1

05

Suffice it to say that during 1952 and 1953, the Secretary-General separated-i.e., discharged-21 employees of U.S. nationality, 17 of whom,
when questioned by official U.S. investigating bodies, invoked their
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to

answer questions concerning their suspected connection with "subversive (Communist) activities." I quote this expression from the 1954
Report of the President to the Congress on the United Nations-a

report transmitted officially by President Eisenhower but, of course,
prepared in the State Department under Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles. All 21 of these persons appealed to the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal, which is a body set up by the General
Assembly to hear appeals of staff members alleging non-compliance
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

6 U.N.
6 U.N.
6 U.N.
6 U.N.

GAOR, 6th
GAOR, 6th
GAOR, 6th
GAOR 346

Comm. 146 (1951).
Comm. 71 (1952).
Comm. 82 (1952).
(1952).
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with their terms of employment. The Administrative Tribunal upheld
the action of the Secretary-General in ten cases and in the other eleven
held that he had not acted in accordance with staff regulations. Trygve
Lie exercised his option to refuse to reinstate any of the eleven
persons and the Tribunal subsequently awarded them penalties
totalling some 180,000 dollars.
The United States fought this award vigorously. Mr. James P.
Richards had the task of explaining the United States case to the Fifth
Committee, which handles the budget of the organization and rarely
enters into such a controversial matter. He spoke at great length on
December 3, 1953.1 06 Most pertinent to the theme of this article
were his remarks about the reviewability by the General Assembly of
decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. He asserted the Assembly's
right to review the mistakes alleged to have been made by the
Administrative Tribunal and gave the Committee a taste of the then
current Administration notion that invocation of a constitutional
privilege was strong evidence of guilt, although he did not phrase his
speech in just those terms. But the United States had to yield to the
vote of the General Assembly on December 9, 1953, in favor of asking
the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the
question of whether the General Assembly had a right to review the
judgments of the Administrative Tribunal. The vote was 41 to 6, with
the United States included among the 13 abstentions. The United
States did succeed, however, in deferring payment of the indemnities
until after the Court had given its opinion.' 07
The United States submitted both written and oral statements to
the Court in support of its opposition to the awards. Nonetheless, on
July 13, 1954, with three judges dissenting, the Court held that the
General Assembly had no right on any grounds to refuse to give effect
to an award of compensation made by the Administrative
Tribunal." ' To the great credit of the United States, it must be
noted that despite the strong American view, Senator Fulbright, as a
member of the U.S. delegation to the ninth session of the General
Assembly, told the Fifth Committee:
...while the United States delegation did not share the Court's opinion as
to the relationship between the Administrative Tribunal and the principal
organs of the United Nations, it would maintain its consistent
policy and
10 9
continue to respect the Court's authority and competence.
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107.
108.
United
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8 U.N. GAOR, 5th Comm. 281-88 (1953).
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Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the
Nations Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. 47.
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A similar problem, however, soon arose in another form. The
Director-General refused to renew the contracts of four United States
nationals who had been employed by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization because of their refusal to appear
before the United States International Organizations Employees
Loyalty Board. The four persons brought their cases to the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation, the
jurisdiction of which previously had been recognized by UNESCO in
dealing with disputes concerning staff employment. The ILO
Administrative Tribunal found that the Director-General of UNESCO
had acted illegally and that the contracts had to either be reinstated or
damages of some 51,000 dollars be paid to the persons affected. In the
Executive Board of UNESCO, the question was whether UNESCO
should exercise its privilege of requesting the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion on the correctness of the ILO
Administrative Tribunal's award. The representative of the United
States on the UNESCO Executive Board was Dr. Athelstan Spilhaus, a
distinguished meteorologist and oceanographer who frankly explained
to the Board that he was not a lawyer and found some of the technical
procedural arguments "hard to understand." Spilhaus explained,
however, that he had obtained advice "from the top lawyers of my
Government who deal with international matters of this kind." He
then made a statement worthy of the most highly qualified jurist:
In discussing this matter, I have sometimes heard the comment that the
issue is trivial and that this is something like taking a traffic offence to the

highest court in a country, but where a matter of principle and precedent is
involved, it is perfectly proper to take a traffic offence to the high court. I
know that in the history of the early development of the law in the United
States, many of the basic definitions of principle were formulated by the
Supreme Court on cases which were perhaps of themselves small in the

amount of damages or the substantive issues involved. It seems to me that
the same thing holds here. It is a question of establishing the law in this case
and to appeal the decisions of the Tribunal in no way reflects on or
undermines our respect for the Tribunal. Whatever the decision of the ICJ
may be, my Government will immediately accept it.1 0
In an opinion rendered on October 23, 1956, the Court upheld the
action of the Administrative Tribunal.'1 " The Executive Board of

UNESCO took note of the opinion and authorized the DirectorGeneral to pay the awards granted by the Tribunal. Mr. E. G.
110. UNESCO Doe. 42 EX/SR 1-27 (SR.14), at 138.
111. Advisory Opinion on the Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of
the International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, [1956] I.C.J. 77.
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Trueblood, substituting for Dr. Spilhaus, informed the UNESCO

board that the United States "did not agree with the majority opinion
of the Court and, anyone reading the report of the opinion, would
probably support the United States Government's view. However,
under the Statute of the Tribunal, the Court's opinion was binding,
and, since the United States Government had a long tradition of
respect for international law, it would not contest that
opinion... ."1

12

Thus, the United States passed the severe strain of

the McCarthy era episodes with credit to its history of support for the
role of the international judicial process, consistently bowing to the
views of the International Court of Justice even when it had been
opposed in the course of litigation.
Another opinion of the Court, this time in agreement with the
views of the United States, was of very considerable importance in the
history of the United Nations. This was the matter of Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, in which the Court was asked to rule
on the question of whether states, members of the United Nations,
were obligated to pay their assessed shares of expenses incurred in the
U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East! 1 I
was a member of the International Court of Justice when the Court
rendered its opinion on this question and therefore I prefer not to go
into its substantive aspects. For the purposes of this article, however, I
may say merely that the United States supported the Court's view that
members were under a legal obligation to pay their assessments. The
United States was one of the seven co-sponsors of the resolution
referring the case to the International Court of Justice. The refusal of
the Soviet Union and France to accept this opinion of the Court has
brought the United Nations to the brink of bankruptcy. The
resolution of the General Assembly that accepted the advisory opinion
was adopted on December 12, 1962, by a vote of 75 to 17, with 14
abstentions. 1 14 The United States cast one of the affirmative votes.

IV. CONCLUSION

Since 1945, when the United Nations was born with the International Court of Justice as its "principal judicial organ," the United
112. UNESCO Doc. 45 EXISR 1-29 (SR.9), at 50.
113. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
Paragraph 2, of the Charter), [1962] I.C.J. 151.
114. 17 U.N. GAOR, 5th Comm. 350 (1962). The General Assembly adopted
the resolution at a plenary meeting on December 19, 1962, by a vote of 76 to 17,
with 8 abstentions.
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States has not been an assiduous advocate or patron of the Court. The
American tradition of submission of international disputes to judicial
settlement has been largely discarded. The record of France and of
Great Britain has been better. There are several possible explanations
for the contrasting position of those two important states. It may be
due in part to the fact that they had been parties to the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice since 1921 and had utilized
that tribunal during the League period. As members of the Council of
the League, they frequently had participated in voting to request the
Permanent Court to give advisory opinions that were found to be
helpful in solving some of the post-war political problems in Europe.
On the other hand, despite the advocacy of every President of the
United States from 1920 to 1940, the United States had failed to
become a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court. This failure
was due largely to the strength of the isolationist element in the
Senate.
At San Francisco, the United States delegation was too fearful of
the Senate and opposed the wish-or at least the willingness-of all
delegations except the Soviet bloc to give the new International Court
of Justice compulsory jurisdiction. Personalities were important.
Senators Vandenberg and Connally were members of the U.S.
delegation and opposed compulsory jurisdiction. Leo Pasvolsky, who
was the principle American architect of the Charter, had a political
rather than a legal turn of mind; he would be classed today as a
"realist"--probably congenial with Kissinger. John Foster Dulles could
have been expected to promote the Court, but later was actually the
instigator of the Connally Amendment, whose deleterious effects have
been noted. Green Hackworth was a State Department Legal Adviser
of the old school, not an aggressive innovator. Charles Fahy, the
Solicitor General of the United States, represented the Attorney
General, who had wished to be a member of the U.S. delegation but
who was barred by the President's decision not to include members of
the Cabinet other than Secretary of State Edward Stettinius.
Stettinius was chairman of the U.S. delegation, but gave no leadership
at all. Fahy practically had to fight his way into the delegation
meetings, while I, as a minor "Assistant on Judicial Organization," was
admitted to only one meeting. At that meeting, which was to discuss
the international court, Senator Connally presided in the absence of
Stettinius and the meeting opened with a statement by Senator
Vandenberg that the question of compulsory jurisdiction was already
settled.
On May 28, 1945, at a meeting of Committee IV/1, which was in
charge of drafting the Statute of the new International Court, Senator
Connally accompanied Legal Adviser Hackworth, who stated that the
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Senator had asked him to explain the position of the United States.

Mr. Hackworth amplified his explanation at a meeting of a subcommittee on the next day. The United States, he said, was devoted to the
principle of judicial settlement and arbitration of international
disputes, but it had not been possible to get the Senate to agree to
accept the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. He

referred to the fact that two leading Senators were at San Francisco as
members of the U.S. delegation and suggested that it was real progress
to find that the United States was now willing to be a party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. He would not say that if
the committee voted to include a provision for compulsory jurisdiction the United States would refuse to participate, but the whole
trend of his argument suggested that this was the case. He suggested
there was need for time to bring about an "evolutionary" development. When the subcommittee report was laid before the full
committee on May 31, 1945, Mr. Hackworth objected to the way his
statement was reported. He had not said it would be "impossible" for
the United States to join if the Court were given compulsory
jurisdiction; he had only said it would be "easier" without that
provision.
Golunsky, one of the two very able Soviet jurists on their
delegation, followed Hackworth in both the committee and the
subcommittee and in each case said that his position was absolutely
the same as that of Mr. Hackworth. He said that there had been a
certain change in opinion in the U.S.S.R. regarding an international
court, but not enough to make it possible to accept a court with
compulsory jurisdiction. Was it not better, Golunsky asked, to have all
states participate in the Court even though it did not meet the desires
of all the delegations at San Francisco? He said that if compulsory
jurisdiction were not included, the U.S.S.R. would become a party to
the statute and (as I wrote in my notes of the subcommittee meeting)
"a considerable part of their legal disputes would be brought before
the Court in various ways." Regrettably, that has not proved to be the
case. At the May 31 meeting, Krylov of the U.S.S.R., who was later to
be a judge of the International Court of Justice, stated emphatically

that "impossible" was the correct word to use to describe the Soviet
opposition to compulsory jurisdiction.
Toward the close of the San Francisco Conference, the United
States delegation decided upon a daring and, some thought, dangerous
enterprise. Under the chairmanship of Isaiah Bowman, President of
the Johns Hopkins University and Special Adviser to the U.S.
delegation to San Francisco, a group of nine of us who were attached
to the U.S. delegation prepared a summary and explanation of the
Charter that was to be sent by the Secretary of State to the President
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immediately after the Charter was signed. Ordinarily, governments or
foreign offices and state departments do not risk public commitment
to interpretations of such a formidable document until after there has
been time for detailed study by all the experts. We worked night and
day and the letter of transmittal from Secretary Stettinius to President
Truman was signed on the same day that the Charter was signed. The
report, with its appendices, is a document of 266 pages. 1 5 I wrote
the section on the International Court of Justice and Mr. Hackworth
approved it without change. On the question of compulsory jurisdiction, the report recalls the debates that led to the inclusion in the
I.C.J. Statute of the same provision that was in the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, known as the "optional
clause" by which states may, if they choose, declare that they accept
for the future the jurisdiction of the Court for a listed category of
legal disputes. (It was to its acceptance of this "optional clause" that
the United States Senate attached the emasculating Connally reservation). The report states that a majority of the delegates on the
committee took the view that it was now possible to move beyond the
optional clause and provide for compulsory jurisdiction. On the other
hand, it was pointed out that the inclusion of such a provision at that
time might make it difficult, if not impossible, for some states to
accept the Statute, a result which no delegate wished to precipitate. In
order to reach agreement, therefore, the committee decided to retain
the present system with its optional clause.
The decision was a wise one under all the circumstances and it was
the expectation of many on the U.S. delegation that the Senate would
agree to the acceptance of the optional clause without any crippling
reservation. Since the Statute of the International Court was made "an
integral part" of the Charter, the Soviet Union might have refused
membership in the organization had the Statute provided for
compulsory jurisdiction. Krylov, the brilliant Soviet jurist, at one
committee meeting submitted his personal opinion that it would not
have been possible, from a legal point of view, for a state to accept the
Charter but attach a reservation excluding acceptance of the Statute
of the Court.
115. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2349, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS-REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JUNE

26, 1945, (1945) (chapter

13 deals with the Court). The group that prepared the report with President
Bowman included Hamilton Fish Armstrong, John D. East, Wilder Foote, Philip
C. Jessup, Walter M. Kotschnig, Archibald MacLeish, Edward G. Miller, Jr. and
Leo Pasvolsky.
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Despite the Connally reservation, the United States could have
made more use of the Court. Furthermore, it can still do so. On
numerous occasions when new Administrations have taken office, the
State Department's Legal Adviser, or some of his staff, have combed
from the files a list of unsettled disputes with other countries that
might be cleared up by submission to the International Court of
Justice. To be sure, the other party can always invoke the Connally
Amendment on the basis of reciprocity and thus block resort to the
Court, but, to my knowledge, the United States has taken the
initiative in only a few cases.
On the other hand, the record of the United States during those
occasions when the U.N. General Assembly has asked the Court for an
advisory opinion has been, on the whole, creditable. I find the
deficiency to exist in the failure of the United States to play a more
positive role in promoting resort to the Court. The Connally
Amendment seems to have become more a frame of mind than a legal
obstacle. One Administration after another has announced that it
favored repeal of the Amendment, but no President has put the item
high enough on his legislative priorities to throw the whole weight of
his office behind such a proposal.

As I have tried to indicate, I think that there is substantial value in
building up the activity of the International Court of Justice. The use
of the Court stimulates the "law habit" in the conduct of foreign
policy. The jurisprudence of the Court develops and clarifies the
applicable rules of international law. As the Court gains in reputation
and importance, I anticipate more care and sincerity in the selection
of the judges.
As a member of a panel under the chairmanship of Nicholas
Katzenbach, which was convened by the United Nations Association
to analyze "The United Nations in the 1970's," I warmly endorse the
following recommendations of that panel:
The Panel has considered how to get increased international judicial
action under way. It believes this, too, requires a concerting of action by a
group of UN Members.
The Panel believes the United States should seek a coalition of Members,
which would:
(a) Agree to vote in the United Nations for the referral to the
International Court of Justice for Advisory Opinions of all disputes over
important legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of
treaties which have been sponsored either by the General Assembly or the
Security Council, and to accept such Advisory Opinions as decisive. (This
provision would in no way alter the obligations of states party to treaties
containing a compulsory ICJ referral clause.)
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(b) Agree to refer to the Court for decision all disputes between two or
more members of the coalition on such subjects as:
(i) protection of the environment
(ii) air navigation
(iii) hijacking
(iv) extradition
(c) Agree to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to decide
any important legal issue in disputes between members of the coalition in
which:
(i) the Security Council recommends reference of such an issue in the
dispute to the Court;
(ii) the General Assembly recommends by a three-fourths majority re1
ference of such an issue in the dispute to the Court. 16
Finally, the panel also recommended the repeal of the Connally Amendment.

116.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE

1970's, supra note 92, at 36.

